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I.
INTRODUCTION
This appeal raises two important issues which aTe not directly addressed by Idaho statutory
or case law. The first issue seeks to clarify the application of the res judicata doctrine in the setting
of a declaratory judgment action where the tortfeasor has admitted that at the time of the accident
he was driving without permission. The second issue seeks guidance on the proper application of
the facts found by the district court to the controlling law on permissive use. This second issue raises
a question that is faced by insurance companies on a daily basis. Resolution of both issues should
aid insurers in reaching more efficient resolution of this type of intercompany insurance dispute in
the future. In arguing to affirm the District Court, the Respondents' brief ignores both the policy and
legal aspects of the District Court's rulings.

A.

Res Judicata.
Appellant Oregon Mutual's first contention on appeal is that the District Court's Default

Judgment was res judicata as to the Respondents' position. Clearly, the conflicting Judgments
entered by the District Court regarding Defendant Lowell Thompson's "permission status" at the
time of the accident demonstrates the need for a clear statement from this Court on the effect of a
default judgment against the tortfeasor on the position of the remaining parties in a declaratory
judgment action.
In sum, on January 3, 2007, the District Court entered a Default Judgment which held that
Mr. Thompson did not have permission, express or implied, to drive the vehicle, and that Oregon

I

Mutual was not required to provide coverage or a defense for Mr. Thompson for all claims arising
out of the subject accident. This Judgment became the "law of the case." The remaining Defendants
did nothing to protect their interest at this point. The District Comi, after a bench trial, subsequently
entered a separate Judgment on April 9, 2008, which contradicted the first Judgment and held that
Mr. Thompson had permission to drive the vehicle at the time of the subject accident. Thus, the
record on appeal contains two separate and unreconcilable Judgments.

What do these two

Judgments mean and how will they be enforced? Does Appellant have a duty to defend Thompson? 1
From the standpoint ofjudicial economy and the finality of Judgments, the action should have ended
when Thompson conceded, by failing to answer, that he did not have permission to drive the vehicle
at the time of the accident. At that point, Mr. Kiser could have received payment for his injuries
under his policies with the Respondent insurers.
Appellant contends that the elements of collateral estoppel have been met, such that the
Default Judgment should have ba1Ted relitigation of the issue of Mr. Thompson's permissive use of
the vehicle, which had already been decided by the District Court. Respondents argue that the
findings of the District Court, as set forth in the Default Judgment, somehow did not apply to them,
and apparently take the position that the inconsistent Judgments should be allowed to stand. Because
the elements of collateral estoppel have been met, and because this Court has recently held that such

1

This Court can take judicial notice that Kiser has filed a lawsuit against Thompson.
Kiser v. Kelly Bramlette, Tananda Bramlette, and Lowell Thompson, Canyon County Case No.
CV07-9792. If Kiser gets a judgment against Thompson, the first Judgment exculpates
Appellant's dnty to pay the Judgment.
2

principles apply equally in cases of default judgment, the District Court's Trial Decision and
subsequent Judgment must be reversed.

B.

The Scope of Permissive Use.
The second issue raised by Oregon Mutual on appeal concerns the District Court's

application of the facts to Idaho's governing law on permissive use. The scope of the permission
granted by the vehicle's co-owner, Tananda Bramlette, to Mr. Thompson is the key issue in this case
and is important to all insurers.
There is no question that Lowell Thompson was the tortfeasor who injured Chris Kiser and
that he was driving Tananda Bramlette's car at the time. The dispute has always turned on whether
the Bramlettes' liability policy or Kiser's uninsured/underinsured motorist policy would pay for
those injuries. Thus, the question of the scope of Thompson's permission is the crux of this dispute
between the insurers.
Since the District Court failed to conduct any analysis as to the scope of Thompson's
permissive use of the vehicle to support its conclusion that Mr. Thompson had permission to drive
the vehicle "at the time of the accident," it failed to make the critical legal finding still at issue at the
time of the trial.2 Respondents ignore the scope of permission issue in their appeal brief, and instead
focus on factors of implied permission prior to and after Tananda's expressed and specific
instructions concerning Mr. Thompson's use of the vehicle. Respondents completely ignore the

2

Assuming Appellant's position on the res judicata issue does not moot this issue.

3

irrefutable and undisputed fact that Mr. Thompson did not have permission to drive the vehicle to
Sand Hollow when the accident occurred. Because Mr. Thompson did not have permission to drive
the vehicle "at the time of the accident," this Cou1i must apply the facts found by the District Court
to the statutory law.

II.

ARGUMENT
A.

The collateral estoppel doctrine barred relitigation of the permissive use issue by the
District Court.
The District Court refused to bar the Respondents' defense when it entered Judgment against

Lowell Thompson. This ruling became the "law of the case" and forced Appellant to move for
summary judgment against the Respondents on other grounds. (See, Appellant's Briefat p. 2.) This
latter portion of the case was unnecessary becanse the first Judgment was dispositive of the
Respondents' interests.
The test for application of the collateral estoppel doctrine is based upon the following five
factors:
(1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in
the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the
issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was
a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom
the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation.

Waller v. State of Idaho, Docket No. 33831, at pp.4-5 (Idaho Aug. 26, 2008); Anderson v. City of
Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 183, 731 P.2d 171 (1986). Although Respondents argue that "not all of
4

the elements of when collateral estoppels [sic] apply have been met," (see, Respondent's brief, p. 7),
it is somewhat unclear as to which elements Respondents concede, and which are being challenged,
as they do not specifically identify the elements at issue.3
Respondents first argue that in order for collateral estoppel to apply, the issue in question
"must have actually been litigated and resolved in the prior suit," implying that collateral estoppel
cannot be applied where an issue is determined through a default judgment. (See, Respondent's

Brief, p. 7.) First, the initial element as set forth in Waller and Anderson is whether the party had a
full and fair "opp01tunity" to litigate the issue. The general rule is that once a judgment is entered
it is resjudicata4 with respect to all issues which were "or could have been" litigated. Waller, supra,

slip op. at 4, citing Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328,333,612 P.2d 1175 (1980); Magic Valley
Radiology, P.A. v. Ko/ouch, 123 Idaho 434, 436-37, 849 P.2d I 07 (1993); Farmer's Nat 'I Bank v.
Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 70, 878 P.2d 762 (I 994).
Respondents filed an Answer to the declaratory judgment action on December 6, 2006, and
thus were active in the case for over three weeks prior to the filing of the Motion for Entry of
Default, which occurred on December 29, 2006. (R., p. 3). Furthermore, the Clerk's Certificate of

3

In Respondents' "Conclusion," they assert that "three of the five elements are not met."
(See, Respondents ' Brief, p.14.)
4

Res judicata, literally "the matter having been judged," is a principle which bars
relitigation of an issue which has been once properly decided. Gaige v. City of Boise, 91 Idaho
481, 425 P.2d 52 (I 967). Res judicata is comprised of claim preclusion (true res judicata) and
issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). Waller v. State of Idaho, Docket No. 33831, at p.3 (Idaho
Aug. 26, 2008)( citations omitted).
5

Service, attached to the Default Judgment, demonstrates that Respondents were served with the
DefaultJudgment on January 3, 2007. Respondents were well aware of the District Comi's findings
of fact and order that Thompson did not have permission to drive and that the six month period to
set aside the Judgment started to run. The Default Judgment indicates in part as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
a. Defendant Lowell Thompson did not have permission, express or implied, to drive
the vehicle, and, as such, the Policy does not require Oregon Mutual to defend,
indemnify or otherwise provide coverage for Defendant Lowell Thompson for all
claims arising out off the January 21, 2006 accident;
Respondents were parties in the case when Oregon Mutual pursued the Default Judgment, and they
could have objected to or moved to set aside the Default Judgment within six months pursuant to
Rule 60(b), I.R.C.P. It cam1ot be said that Respondents did not have an "opportU11ity" to litigate the
issue of permissive use. Whether the Respondents have any interest in the Appellant's insurance
policy is totally dependent on whether Mr. Thompson was a permissive driver. Nevertheless, the
record demonstrates that Respondents had the opportunity, but chose to do nothing, and thereby
accepted the findings of the District Court in the Default Judgment.
Moreover, Respondents' suggestion that collateral estoppel cannot be applied where an issue
is determined through a default judgment has already been addressed and rejected by this Court in

Waller, supra. As stated in Waller, "absent fraud or collusion, the principle of res judicata applies
equally in cases of default judgment." (Id., p. 5), citing Beesley v. Beesley, 114 Idaho 536, 537, 758
P.2d 695 (1988). Thus, Respondents' apparent challenge to the first element of the collateral
estoppel test must fail.
6

Respondents next argue that collateral estoppel should not apply because the Default
Judgment was not entered against them. (See, Respondent's Brief, p. 8.) This contention presumably
relates to the fifth listed factor in Waller and Anderson, which requires that the party who the
judgment is asserted against was a party or in privity with the party to the prior judgment.
Respondents have not explained how the District Court's entry of default against Thompson relates
to this or any of the other listed factors in determining application of the collateral estoppel doctrine.
Respondents conclude that "[b ]ased on the language of the judgment, it is clear that the Default
Judgment was only to apply to Defendant Lowell Thompson, and not the remaining Defendants."
(See, Respondent's Brief, p. 6.) Respondents offer no argument or authority in support of this

unfounded conclusion, nor do they attempt to reconcile the two conflicting Judgments.
As a practical matter, it makes no sense whatsoever that the District Comi could determine
that Thompson did not have permission to drive the vehicle with respect to the declaratory judgment
action against him, but that he did have permission to drive the vehicle as to the imputed negligence
statute's application concerning the Respondents. There is no coverage under the policy and there
is no imputed liability at all if Thompson did not have permission to drive the vehicle at the time of
the accident. Permission either existed or it did not. There cannot be permission and a lack of
permission at the same time, and therefore the District Court's determination in the Default
Judgment that no permission existed necessarily applies to and affects all parties involved.
Respondents offer no additional argument concerning the elements of collateral estoppel until
their "Conclusion," wherein they assert that "the decision on the default judgment was procedural

7

in nature rather than substantive a11d the merits of permissive verses non permissive use was not
litigated." (See, Respondent's Brief, p.13.) This contention presumably relates to the fourth listed
factor in Waller a11d Anderson, which requires a final judgment on the merits. As indicated by this
Court in Waller, under the doctrine of res judicata, "the underlying default a11d child support order
constitutes a final decision that was decided on the merits ... " Waller, supra, slip op. at 4. In the
present case, the District Court entered a Default Judgment, with specific findings that Thompson
"did not have permission, express or implied, to drive the vehicle . . " (See, 1/3/07 Default

Judgment; p. 2.)' As such, it amounts to a final judgment on the merits.
The issue of permissive use was decided when the District Court ordered in the Default
Judgment that Thompson did not have permission to drive the vehicle, and that Oregon Mutual is
not required to provide coverage for Thompson for all claims arising out of the January 21, 2006
accident. The elements required for collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of the issue ofThompson' s
permissive use of the vehicle have been met. Therefore, the second a11d inconsistent Trial Decision
and Judgment of April 9, 2008 cannot be affirmed on appeal.

B.

Thompson did not have permission to drive the vehicle to Sand Hollow.

1.

Standard of Review Analysis:

Respondents have cited Idaho law for the proposition that the issue of permission is a
question of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact, a11d that this Court will set aside a trial court's

5

This document has been included in the record on appeal pursuant to this Comi's Order
Granting Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal, dated September 8, 2008.
8

findings of fact only if they are clearly enoneous. (See, Respondents' Brief, pp.5,9.) However, for
purposes of this appeal, Appellant is not challenging the District Court's findings of fact. Rather,
Appellant challenges the District Court's application the facts it found to Idaho's permissive use
laws, including I.C. §49-2417 and case law concerning the scope of permission. The District Court
neglected to consider whether its finding that Thompson had permission to drive to a gas station
down the street amount to permission to drive to the next county. In fact, the District Court's Trial
Decision did not even set forth specific "Conclusions of Law" on this issue as required by Rule
52(a), I.R.C.P. Under such circumstances, Appellant submits that this Court should exercise free
review as the applicable standard of review. See, i.e. Rule 52(a), I.R.C.P.; Trees v. Kersey, 138
Idaho 3, 56 P.3d 765, 768 (2002).
2.

Scope of Permission:

Tm1anda testified that after she dropped off her vehicle at the tire center, she never spoke with
Mr. Thompson again until after the accident. Mr. Thompson, on the other hand, testified that he
drove the vehicle from the tire center to Tananda's place of employment, and that she told him to
"go right down the street and put some gas in it and come right back." (R., p.205, deposition of

Thompson, p.12.) The District Court chose to believe Mr. Thompson's testimony and determined
that Tananda gave Mr. Thompson permission to drive the vehicle. Once again, this finding of fact
is not contested for purposes of this appeal.
Both the District Court (in its Trial Decision) and Respondents (in their Appeal Brief)
ignored the critical issue of the scope of the expressed permission, and the application of such
9

permission to Idaho's imputed negligence statute. In other words, given the limited scope of the
expressed pennission granted by Tananda to Mr. Thompson, should the negligence of Mr. Thompson
be imputed to the owners of the vehicle where Mr. Thompson admittedly exceeded the scope of
permission and drove the vehicle at a time and in a place which had been forbidden by the owner?
Does Idaho law hold that once a person is given permission to drive the vehicle that permission is
limitless? Does Idaho law require a revocation before the permission terminates?
Although the District Comt concluded as a matter oflaw that Mr. Thompson had permission
to drive the vehicle "at the time of the accident," there is no factual finding in the record to support
the legal conclusion. Mr. Thompson testified that Tananda was adamant that he was to "go right
down the street6 and put some gas in it and come right back." (R., p.205, deposition a/Thompson,
pp.12-13.) Instead of complying with that expressed permission, Mr. Thompson decided that he was
going to drive approximately one hour away to Sand Hollow for his own personal reasons. (Id.,
pp. I 2, 47, 48, 49.) The accident occurred approximately 30-45 minutes away from Tananda's place
of employment. (Ir., pp.57-60.) Furthermore, Mr. Thompson admitted that he did not follow
Tananda's instructions to get gas and return, and that he "made a stupid choice in not doing what she
told me to do." (R., p.205, deposition a/Thompson, pp.23,48,52.) The expressed permission that
was granted to Mr. Thompson was extremely limited. Thus, it is clear and undisputed that Mr.

6

Mr. Thompson's understanding and initial intent was to go to the Maverick to get gas,
which was about one-quarter of a mile away from the Wal-Mart where Tananda was working.
(R., p.205, deposition a/Thompson, p.46.)
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Thompson did not have expressed permission to drive the vehicle "at the time of the accident."
Respondents argue that because Mr. Thompson was given permission to operate the vehicle,
"it was not necessary for him to be operation [sic] the vehicle as instructed by Ms. Bramlette at the
exact moment of the accident." (See, Respondent's Brief, p.11.) Without citing any relevant
authority,7 and without any support in the record, Respondents then conclude that Mr. Thompson
had both express and implied permission to operate Plaintiffs' vehicle "at the time of the subject
accident." (See, Respondent's Brief, p.11.)
With respect to expressed permission, Mr. Thompson's testimony can be summarized as
follows:
I did not follow Tananda's instructions. I did not have permission to drive the
vehicle to Sand Hollow. I only had permission to drive down the street to get gas at
the Maverick and come right back.
Such testimony clearly does not amount to expressed permission to drive at the time of the accident
to trigger application of the imputed negligence statute.
With respect to implied permission, it is completely unreasonable to imply from the
undisputed instructions given to Mr. Thompson by Tananda, that Mr. Thompson could drive the

7

Respondents cite Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Hmelevsky, 97 Idaho 46, 539
P.2d 598 (1975), for the proposition that precise permission to do what the driver is doing at the
precise moment of the accident is unnecessary in situations involving family members. The case
at bar is not a situation where a parent occasionally lets his child use the family vehicle, and it is
unclear whether the child had permission to be driving at the precise moment of the accident.
Rather, the facts of this case are undisputed and clear -- Mr. Thompson did not have permission
to drive the vehicle to Sand Hollow at the time of the accident!
11

vehicle to Sand Hollow. Respondents' argument, in essence, is that even though Mr. Thompson was
instructed only to drive down the street to get gas and to come right back, it is implied that he had
permission to drive wherever he wanted at that point, including trips to distant locations for personal
reasons.
Respondents highlight the fact that Tananda and Mr. Thompson continued to live together
after the accident, and that Mr. Thompson subsequently became the father ofTananda's baby. Such
facts are irrelevant as of the date of the accident. When the accident occurred, Tananda and Mr.
Thompson had only known each other for a few months, and did not have a baby together. (Tr., pp.

I 0, I I, 29, 44). In any event, the undisputed, specific instructions given to Mr. Thompson disprove
the notion that it was implied that Mr. Thompson could drive where he did at the time of the
accident. For these reasons, and because the District Court failed to even consider the limited scope
of Mr. Thompson's permission and application of such permission "at the time of the accident," the
Trial Decision must be reversed.

C.

Attorney fees and costs on appeal are unwarranted.
Respondents cite Rules 40 and 41, I.A.R., I.C. §12-121, and Rule 54(e)(I), l.R.C.P., as a

basis for attorney fees and costs on appeal. This Court may award attorney fees to the prevailing
party only if it is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought or pursued frivolously,
unreasonably, or without fow1dation. Vanvooren v. Astin, 141 Idaho 440, I 11 P.3d 125, 129 (2005).
For reasons set forth herein, the decision of the district court should be reversed, in which case
Respondents would not be the prevailing party and would not be entitled to any costs or fees.
12

However, even if this Court affirms the District Court's ruling, the record fails to support a finding
that the appeal was pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.
It appears that this is a case of first impression with respect to both the collateral estoppel
issue and the scope of permission issue, in that there is minimal guidance from prior case law that
is directly on point in connection with the unique circumstances presented in this case.

As

previously referenced, the District Court has entered inconsistent Judgments which create confusion
as to Oregon Mutual's obligations under the policy, including those which may be asserted in the
future by Mr. Kiser upon obtaining a judgment in the pending litigation against Mr. Thompson. The
inconsistent judgments also create confusion as to Respondents' potential obligations to Mr. Kiser
for uninsured/underinsured benefits. Additionally, the District Court's failure to even address the
scope of permission issue precludes a finding that the appeal is frivolous.

III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Oregon Mutual respectfully requests that the Court reverse the
Trial Decision of the District Court.
DATED thisZorLziay of October, 2008.
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC

By:

_.---'1c_;_o_f1_/_,_o/:=
__'7..__
_ _ _ __

L u Piccioni, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Appellant Oregon Mutual
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